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Chapter 2





Philosophers have used information theoretic 
concepts and theorems for philosophical purposes 
since the publication of Shannon’s seminal work, 
“The Mathematical Theory of Communication”. 
The efforts of different philosophers led to the 
formation of Philosophy of Information as a sub-
field of philosophy in the late 1990s (Floridi, in 
press). Although a significant part of those efforts 
was devoted to the mathematical formalism of 
information and communication theory, a thor-
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ough analysis of the fundamental mathematical 
properties of information-carrying relations has 
not yet been done. This is an important gap in the 
literature because fundamental properties such 
as reflexivity, symmetry and transitivity are not 
only important for mathematical purposes, but 
also for philosophical purposes. For example, in 
almost all attempts to use information theoretic 
concepts for philosophical purposes, information-
carrying relations are assumed to be transitive. 
This assumption fits our intuitive understanding 
of information. On the other hand, the transitivity 
assumption has some controversial consequences. 
For information theoretic concepts to be useful 
for philosophical purposes, the semantic infor-
mational content of a signal needs to be uniquely 
identified. In standard accounts, the informational 
content of a signal is defined by conditional prob-
abilities. However, conditional probabilities obey 
transitivity only if when they are 1, and thus the 
informational content of a signal is fixed in an 
absolute manner. This leads to the denial of partial 
information and misinformation, which sounds 
implausible at first glance (Lehrer & Cohen 1983; 
Usher 2001). Some have preferred to accept the 
dichotomy and live with the ensuing seemingly 
implausible consequence (Dretske 1981). Others 
have tried to avoid the implausible consequence 
by using some other notions from the stock of 
mathematical theory of communication, such as 
mutual information (Usher 2001; Harms 1998). 
The point here is that a thorough analysis of the 
fundamental properties of information-carrying 
relations will shed light on some important 
controversies. The overall aim of this chapter is 
to begin this process of elucidation. It therefore 
includes a detailed examination of three semantic 
theories of information: Dretske’s entropy-based 
framework, Harms’ theory of mutual information 
and Cohen and Meskin’s counterfactual theory. 
These three theories are selected because they 
represent all lines of reasoning available in the 
literature in regard to the relevance of Shan-
non’s mathematical theory of information1 for 
philosophical purposes. Thus, the immediate goal 
is to cover the entire landscape of the literature 
with respect to this criterion. Moreover, this 
chapter offers a novel analysis of the transitivity 
of information-carrying relations. Until recently, 
transitivity has been assumed without question. 
Cohen and Meskin’s work (2006) is the first in 
the literature that challenges this assumption. 
They claim that information-carrying relations 
need not be transitive; there are cases where this 
assumption fails. They state this claim, however, 
without giving any argument; they simply assert it, 
which is understandable given the scope of their 
article. This chapter provides a novel argument 
in support of their claim. The argument is based 
on the Data Processing Inequality theorem of the 
mathematical theory of information.
Given this framework, the chapter is organized 
as follows. Section 1 is a basic introduction to 
equivalence relations and may be bypassed by 
those who are already familiar with this topic. 
Section 2 is a brief historical survey of the lit-
erature. Section 3 analyzes the three semantic 
theories mentioned in the previous paragraph, in 
chronological order. Section 4 answers the follow-
ing question: What are the desired properties of 
information-carrying relations for philosophical 
purposes? Lastly, Section 5 concludes the chapter 
with some suggestions for future research. There is 
also a short glossary of technical terms at the end.
EQUIVALENCE RELATIONS: A 
PRELIMINARY INTRODUCTION
A relation could have any number of arguments: 
one, two, three, four and so on. For example, a 
‘being in between’ relation requires three argu-
ments, that a is in between b and c, and therefore 
is a 3-place relation. Similarly, ‘being the father 
of’ is an example of a 2-place relation with two 
arguments: the father and the child. These 2-place 
relations are also called binary relations. Our main 
focus in this chapter is binary relations, since an 
18
The Fundamental Properties of Information-Carrying Relations
equivalence relation is a binary relation with some 
specific properties.
A binary relation is a collection of ordered 
pairs. The first member of the pair comes from 
the domain; the second member is a member 
of a set called the co-domain. The collection of 
ordered pairs is a subset of the Cartesian product 
of the domain and the co-domain. For example, A 
x A is the Cartesian product of A with itself, and 
any subset of this product is a binary relation. In 
formal notation, let X (domain) and Y (co-domain) 
be sets; then any R that satisfies the following 
condition is a binary relation.
R ⊆ X x Y or equivalently, R = {<a,b> |a ∈ X 
and b ∈ Y }
When a pair forms a relation, the first member 
of the pair is related to the second member of the 
pair. In other words, if <a,b> ∈ R, then we write 
aRb. One of the first questions that mathematicians 
ask about a binary relation is whether or not it is 
an equivalence relation. Equivalence relations split 
up their domain into disjoint (mutually exclusive) 
subsets; they partition their domain. Each of these 
disjoint subsets is called an equivalence class. 
Members of an equivalence class are equivalent 
under the terms of the relation. Any member of the 
domain is a member of one and only one equiva-
lence class. This is a desirable feature because 
it neatly organizes the domain and avoids any 
ambiguity in terms of class membership. Figure 
1 is a visual example of how an equivalence rela-
tion may divide up the domain set into mutually 
exclusive subsets.
For a binary relation to be an equivalence 
relation, it has to have three properties: reflexiv-
ity, symmetry and transitivity. Reflexivity simply 
means that every member of the relation has to 
enter into relation with itself. Symmetry, which 
may also be called mirroring, implies that for every 
pair (<a,b>) that falls under the relation, the mir-
ror image of the pair, (<b,a>), is also a member 
of the relation. As the name suggests, transitivity 
requires that if a is related to b and b is related to 
c, then a must be related to c. It may be helpful 
to state these properties in mathematical notation 
and explain some of their features.
Reflexivity
A relation is reflexive if and only if
∀ a∈X, aRa
Figure 1. Domain Set
19
The Fundamental Properties of Information-Carrying Relations
An example of a reflexive relation is ‘being 
divisible by itself’. The opposite of reflexivity 
is anti-reflexivity. Anti-reflexivity is not simply 
a failure of reflexivity; rather, it is a stronger 
condition. A relation is anti-reflexive if and only 
if no member of the domain enters into relation 
with itself.
A relation is anti-reflexive if and only if
∀ a∈X, ~aRa
‘Being the father of’ is such a relation, because 
no human being is the father of himself. Since 
anti-reflexivity is stronger than the mere failure of 
reflexivity, we have some relations that are neither 
reflexive nor anti-reflexive. For such relations, 
both the reflexivity and anti-reflexivity conditions 
fail. An example of such a relation is ‘liking him-
self’. Since some people do not like themselves, 
this relation is not reflexive. Likewise, since some 
people do like themselves, it is not anti-reflexive. 
Like reflexivity, both symmetry and transitivity 
also have a middle category which neither has the 
property nor has the opposite of the property. As 
will be explained in the following sections, this 
middle category turns out to be very important 
for the philosophy of information.
Symmetry
A relation is symmetric if and only if
∀ a,b ∈ X, aRb ⇒ bRa
An example of a symmetric relation is ‘being a 
relative of’. If a is a relative of b, then b is also a 
relative of a. Similar to reflexivity, the opposite of 
symmetry (anti-symmetry) is not simply a failure 
of the original condition.
A relation is anti-symmetric if and only if
∀ a,b ∈ X, (aRb ∧ a ≠ b) ⇒ ~ bRa
As the condition states, anti-symmetry requires 
that for no pair of the relation is its mirror image 
a member of the relation, unless the members of 
the pair are identical to each other. An example 
of an anti-symmetric relation is ‘being greater 
than’ as defined in the domain of numbers. If a 
is greater than b, then there is no way for b to be 
greater than a. As in the case of reflexivity, there 
are some relations that are neither symmetric nor 
anti-symmetric. ‘Being fond of someone’ is such 
a relation. If a is fond of b, b is also fond of a in 
some cases, but in other cases this may not be 
true. Thus, both symmetry and anti-symmetry 
conditions fail.
Transitivity
A relation is transitive if and only if
∀ a,b ∈ X, (aRb ∧ bRc) ⇒ aRc
A simple example of a transitive relation is 
identity. If a is identical to b and b is identical to 
c, then a has to be identical to c. As in the case of 
reflexivity and symmetry, the opposite of transitiv-
ity, which is called anti-transitivity, is not simply 
the failure of the transitivity condition. It states 
that the transitivity condition must not hold for 
any member of the relation. More formally:
A relation is anti-transitive if and only if
∀ a,b ∈ X, (aRb ∧ bRc) ⇒ ~aRc
Although the common name for this character-
istic is anti-transitivity, in order to be consistent 
with the philosophy of information literature, we 
shall refer to it here as intransitivity. An example 
of an intransitive relation is ‘being the mother 
of’. The transitivity condition fails for all pairs 
that fall under this relation. Whether or not there 
is a third category in which both transitivity and 
intransitivity fail is an important question. Some 
claim that preference relations (a is preferred 
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over b) are such an example. If a is preferred 
over b, and b is preferred over c, then a may be 
preferred over c in some cases and not in some 
others. One of the main claims of this chapter is 
that information-carrying relations are neither 
transitive nor intransitive.
Now we have completed our basic introduction 
to equivalence relations. In the following section, 
we will examine some selective proposals for 
identifying the content of information-carrying 
relations and then analyze those proposals in terms 
of the basic properties covered in this section.
INFORMATION-CARRYING 
RELATIONS: A BRIEF 
HISTORICAL SURVEY
When we say ‘information-carrying relations,’ 
what we intuitively mean by this is that some 
entity carries information about some other entity. 
This intuitive idea definitely points to a relation, 
but it is neither precise nor formal enough to be 
used in a theoretical framework. Step by step, it 
needs to be clarified and formalized. Let’s start 
with a simple information-carrying claim.
A carries information that B.
There are two important questions that need to 
be answered for clarifying this claim. First, what 
are A and B? In other words, what is the domain 
over which the relation is defined? The domain 
could be just propositions or it could also include 
natural signs. Let’s call this ‘the domain ques-
tion.’ The second question is about the content of 
the ‘information-carrying relation.’ What does it 
mean to carry information about something else? 
To put it differently, how could we formalize the 
content of the relation? It is natural to call this 
‘the content question.’
The Domain Question
Although Shannon’s mathematical work may be 
considered the starting point of the philosophy of 
information, his work was mainly for engineering 
purposes. He clearly stated that his mathematical 
formalism does not deal with philosophical ques-
tions. When philosophers began using Shannon’s 
work for their own purposes, they labeled their 
efforts as ‘semantic theories of information’ in 
order to emphasize their interest in philosophical 
questions. For example, Bar-Hillel and Carnap 
(19520, in the earliest attempt of using informa-
tion theoretic concepts in philosophy, called their 
theory ‘An Outline of a Theory of Semantic In-
formation’. More or less, this trend has continued 
since then, and Floridi’s theory (2004), ‘A Strongly 
Semantic Theory of Information,’ is one of the 
most recent examples of this trend. Use of the 
qualifier ‘semantic’ is not just for emphasizing an 
interest in philosophical questions; it also gives us 
pointers as to the answer of the domain question. 
The word ‘semantic’ tells us that the members of 
the domain over which the information-carrying 
relations are defined must have an identifiable 
semantic content. Thus, the domain consists of 
propositions. Although restricting the domain 
to propositions is perfectly acceptable for some 
philosophical purposes, such a domain does not 
encompass all possible entities that may carry 
information. For example, natural signs such 
as smoke or dark clouds also carry information 
(Grice 1989). If that is the case, then the domain 
must include these signs, as well. Natural signs 
are not the only category that is an example of 
non-propositional information bearers. Some 
non-natural signs may also carry information. As 
Floridi puts it, “when you turned the ignition key, 
the red light of the low battery indicator flashed. 
This signal too can be interpreted as an instance 
of environmental information” (Floridi, in press). 
Although the red light is not a natural sign, it does 
still carry information. Floridi calls this type of 
information ‘environmental information.’ He ac-
cepts the legitimacy of such information but claims 
that it can be reduced to ‘semantic information’, 
which is necessarily propositional. Whether or 
not Floridi is right in his reductive claim is con-
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troversial, but to pursue this question would take 
us too far away from the general framework of 
this chapter. Suffice it to mention that the jury is 
still out on Floridi’s claim.
Dretske also focuses on propositional infor-
mation in his theory of semantic information. He 
chooses all of his examples from propositions with 
identifiable content. However, he also acknowl-
edges the possibility of information-bearers with-
out an identifiable content, i.e., non-propositional 
information bearers. In his own words,
Up to this point examples have been carefully 
chosen so as to always yield an identifiable con-
tent. Not all signals, however, have informational 
content that lends itself so neatly and economically 
to propositional expressions. (Dretske 1981, p. 68)
Similar to Dretske and Floridi, Cohen and Me-
skin, in their exploration of a counterfactual theory 
of information, also use the set of propositions as 
the domain for information-carrying relations. 
Here is how they define information-carrying 
relations: “x’s being F carries information about 
y’s being G if the counterfactual conditional ‘if 
y were not G, then x would not have been F’ is 
non-vacuously true” (Cohen & Meskin 2006, p. 
335). In this definition, the entities that may bear 
information clearly are propositions. However, 
this does not mean that Cohen and Meskin do not 
accept the possibility of non-propositional entities 
as information bearers; they only restrict their 
counterfactual analysis to propositions.
After this brief survey, we may conclude that 
almost all theories of semantic information identify 
the domain as the set of propositions. However, 
non-propositional entities such as natural signs 
also need to be taken into account while identifying 
the proper domain for information-carrying rela-
tions. Thus, the conclusion is that the fundamental 
properties of information-carrying relations must 
be analyzed for two different possible domains: 
one that includes only propositions and another 
that includes non-propositional signals as well 
as propositions.
The Content Question
To identify the domain of a relation is the first 
order of business, but it is not the whole story. The 
content of a relation also needs to be unambigu-
ously determined. For most relations, this task is 
straightforward. For example, ‘the greater than’ 
relation for numbers is clear and unambiguous, 
and so is the ‘being the father of’ relation. Any 
controversy about whether this relation holds 
between two human beings can be resolved with 
a DNA test. In the case of information-carrying 
relations, however, the situation is rather messy 
because the concept of information is prevalently 
used in many different senses (Floridi, in press; 
Allo 2007; Scarantino and Piccinini, in press). 
In fact, whether or not there could be a common 
denominator for all different uses of information 
is also not clear. Shannon himself pointed out 
this wide usage of information and also stated 
his suspicion about the existence of a common 
denominator.
The word ‘information’ has been given different 
meanings by various writers in the general field 
of information theory. It is likely that at least a 
number of these will prove to be useful in certain 
applications to deserve further study and perma-
nent recognition. It is hardly to be expected that a 
single concept of information would satisfactorily 
account for the numerous possible applications 
of the general field. (1950, p. 80)
Given this prevalent and ambiguous usage of 
the notion of information, philosophers who need 
to identify the content of such relations can only 
proceed by providing a formalism for the meaning 
of ‘information’ that they use. There have been 
several attempts to do so. A brief historical survey, 
starting with Shannon’s formalism, is useful for 
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understanding the evolution of these endeavors. 
Before we start our historical survey, though, 
a disclaimer is in order. This is by no means a 
complete historical survey; rather, I included four 
representative theories. Bar-Hillel and Carnap’s 
theory is included because it is the first example 
of a semantic theory of information. Dretske’s 
theory is covered because of its scope and influ-
ence. Harms’ and Cohen and Meskin’s theories are 
surveyed because they represent different attitudes 
toward the relevance of Shannon’s mathematical 
theory of information. There are several important 
philosophical theories of information that had to be 
left out due to the space constraints of this chapter. 
Some examples are Sayre (1976), Devlin (1991), 
Barwise and Seligmann (1997) and Floridi (2004). 
Needless to say, exclusion from this chapter does 
not represent any judgment about the quality of 
those semantic theories of information.
Since the first edition of Shannon’s seminal 
article, “The Mathematical Theory of Communica-
tion”, both philosophers and psychologists began 
adopting the notions that Shannon develops for 
their own purposes. They realized the potential 
value of notions such as information, entropy and 
channels for solving philosophical and psycho-
logical problems. After all, the relation between 
the human mind and the external world is one of 
communication, and Shannon’s formalism has 
proven to have a high explanatory power for the 
notions of communication channels and informa-
tion transmission. After that initial enthusiastic 
reaction, however, philosophers realized that 
there are fundamental differences between Shan-
non’s information and the notion that they need 
for their own philosophical purposes. Shannon’s 
goal was to formalize the best method for coding 
and encoding messages for communication pur-
poses. Given these engineering purposes, he had 
to work at an abstract level at which the content 
of a signal did not matter. After all, he needed a 
theory that could be applied to any content that 
might be communicated.
Shannon’s main question was the following: 
given a set of possible states, what is the expected 
surprisal value of a particular state that belongs 
to the set of all possible states? More formally, 
he strove to determine the expected value of a 
random ri where ri is a member of S={ ri, ri, ri, 
… rn}. He started out with three basic intuitions:
i.  The expected value should depend only on 
the probability of ri , not on the content of 
ri ;
ii.  The expected surprise should be a kind of 
expected value;
iii.  The expected surprisal value of an ri 
should increase as the ri s become more 
equiprobable.
The last intuition is similar to the case of a 
fair and unfair coin. The result of a toss of a fair 
coin is less anticipated than that of an unfair coin. 
Surprisingly enough, the only set of functions that 
satisfy these three intuitions is the set of entropy 
functions of thermodynamics.2 The very first of 
Shannon’s three basic intuitions implies that his 
theory is not about the content of a signal, but 
rather it is about the amount of information that 
a signal or a probability distribution for a set of 
states has. Shannon clearly stated this fact in 
their seminal work: “These semantic aspects of 
communication are irrelevant to the engineering 
problem” (Shannon 1948, p. 382). In a similar vein, 
Colin Cherry, another communication engineer, 
emphasized this aspect of the mathematical theory 
of communication: “It is important to emphasize, 
at the start, that we are not concerned with the 
[content] or the truth of messages; semantics lies 
outside of the scope of mathematical information 
theory” (Cherry 1951). This statement about the 
mathematical theory of information shows the 
point where Shannon’s and the philosophers’ 
interests diverge. Philosophers are interested in 
identifying the content of a signal, whereby the 
signal may be a linguistic or mental entity. This 
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divergence led philosophers to search for a more 
suitable notion of information. Bar-Hillel and 
Carnap’s theory of semantic information was the 
earliest such attempt. Their theory is based on 
Carnap’s logical analysis of probability (Carnap 
1950). Accordingly, the content of an informa-
tional signal can be defined negatively by the set 
of all possible state descriptions that are excluded 
by the signal (Floridi, in press, p. 141). Although 
this was a step toward identifying the content of 
an informational signal consistent with the re-
quirements of Shannon’s mathematical theory of 
information, Bar-Hillel and Carnap’s theory had 
a serious shortcoming that leads to a paradoxical 
situation. In their formalization, contradictions 
carry an infinite amount of information (Bar-Hillel 
& Carnap 1952, p. 21).3 This feature of their theory, 
to say the least, is implausible.
Dretske, in his 1980 book Knowledge and 
the Flow of Information, also tried to provide a 
semantic theory of information consistent with 
the mathematical theory of information. Dretske’s 
framework deserves attention for three main 
reasons. First, Dretske attempted to explain per-
ceptual content, belief and knowledge in terms of 
informational content. In that respect, his frame-
work encompasses a wide range of philosophical 
issues. Second, his theory is the earliest example 
of one of the relational properties of information 
carrying, (i.e., transitivity, playing a central role). 
Despite its importance, however, transitivity also 
leads to a controversial feature of the theory. For 
Dretske, information necessarily implies truth. In 
other words, propositions that are not true do not 
carry information. Third, according to Dretske, 
Shannon’s mathematical theory of information is 
not very useful for epistemology or philosophy of 
mind because it is about the average information 
that a set of messages contains, whereas epistemol-
ogy and philosophy of mind are concerned about 
whether a person knows or acquires a particular 
fact on the basis of a particular signal. In other 
words, philosophical issues hinge on the specific 
content of information, not just the amount of 
information that a signal carries. Despite these 
diverging interests, Dretske believes that some no-
tions of Shannon’s theory could be a starting point 
for solving philosophical problems. He borrows 
the notion of entropy of a signal from Shannon 
and develops his semantic theory of information.
Several philosophers, however, questioned 
some of Dretske’s claims. The first targeted claim 
was the inseparable connection between informa-
tion and truth. Some found truth encapsulation, 
i.e., that if a signal carries information about p, 
then p has to be true, to be too demanding. The 
second target was Dretske’s claim about the lack 
of usefulness of Shannon’s mathematical theory. 
Contrary to Dretske, several philosophers claimed 
that Shannon’s theory could be more useful for 
philosophical purposes. For example, Grandy 
(1987) provided an information theoretic ap-
proach based on Shannon’s mutual information, 
and claimed that a proper use of mutual informa-
tion could serve as a basis for an ecological and 
naturalized epistemology. Similarly, Harms (1998) 
claimed that mutual information provides an ap-
propriate measure of tracking efficiency for the 
naturalistic epistemologist, and that this measure 
of epistemic success is independent of semantic 
maps and payoff structures. Usher (2001) proposed 
a naturalistic schema of primitive conceptual 
representations using the statistical measure of 
mutual information. In order to see how the no-
tion of mutual information develops in regard to 
philosophical problems, it is useful to examine 
this line of reasoning, but because of current lack 
of space, it is not possible to thoroughly cover 
these three attempts. We shall therefore pick 
Harms’ framework as the representative of this 
line of reasoning and examine it in detail in the 
next section.
Finally, there is one more theory that needs to 
be included in our historical survey and analysis: 
Cohen and Meskin’s counterfactual theory of in-
formation. The importance of the counterfactual 
theory of information lies in the fact that it does 
not borrow any notions from Shannon’s math-
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ematical theory of information. In fact, Cohen 
and Meskin claim that using Shannon’s insight 
about entropy and uncertainty reduction, as in 
Dretske’s framework, leads to a doxastic theory 
of information and not an objective one (Cohen 
& Meskin 2006, p. 340). Moreover, their theory 
is the first in the literature in which the transitivity 
of information-carrying relations is questioned. 
Thus, in terms of their take on Shannon’s theory 
and transitivity, they represent a line of reasoning 
different from both Dretske’s and Harms’.
To review, in this section we have surveyed 
three suggestions for answering the ‘content 
question.’ Dretske identifies the content of 
information-carrying relations in terms of entropy 
and conditional probabilities. In that respect, his 
framework utilizes some conceptual tools of 
Shannon’s mathematical theory of information, 
leading to an independent semantic theory in 
which perceptual content, belief and knowledge 
are accounted for in terms of informational content. 
Contrary to Dretske, Harms thinks that Shannon’s 
framework is much more in line with semantic 
purposes of philosophers, and he develops a theory 
based on the notion of mutual information. Cohen 
and Meskin think that the fundamental insights 
and concepts of Shannon’s mathematical theory 
are not good candidates for clarifying semantic 
issues; instead, they suggest a counterfactual ac-
count. Thus, an analysis of these three theories 
in terms of relational properties (reflexivity, sym-
metry and transitivity) will cover the landscape 
of the literature of philosophy of information to 
a satisfactory extent. Doing so is the main task 
of the next section.
THREE DEFINITIONS OF 
SEMANTIC CONTENT
In this section, we will analyze Dretske’s, Harms’ 
and Cohen and Meskin’s theories in more detail 
and also evaluate their suggestions for identifying 
informational content in terms of the fundamental 
relational properties.
Dretske
Dretske bases his theory on the notion of infor-
mational content. By using this notion, together 
with the tools of Shannon’s theory, Dretske aims 
to give an account of mental content, perception, 
belief and knowledge. Dretske defines the notion 
of informational content as follows:
Informational Content: A signal r carries the 
information that s is F = the conditional prob-
ability of s’s being F, given r (and k), is 1 (but, 
given k alone, less than 1) [k refers to background 
knowledge]. (Dretske 1981, p. 65) 
As a result of assigning unity to the condi-
tional probability, Dretske rejects the possibility 
of partial information and misinformation. He 
says that ““information is certain; if not, it is not 
information at all.” Although this claim, dubbed 
the ‘Veridicality Thesis’ by Floridi, is useful for 
some philosophical purposes (e.g., semantic 
analysis of true propositions; Floridi 2007), for 
some other purposes (e.g., accounting for mental 
representation; Demir 2006) it turns out to be 
counter-productive. Before making any judgment 
about this issue, it is important to understand 
Dretske’s rationale for insisting on this claim about 
information-carrying relations. His main rationale 
is to distinguish genuine information-carrying 
relations from coincidental correlations. If your 
room and my room have the same temperature at 
a given moment, the thermometers in both rooms 
will show the same temperature, yet it would be 
wrong to say that the thermometer in your room 
carries information about my room’s temperature. 
For an information-carrying relation, there needs 
to be some lawful dependency between the number 
that the thermometer shows and the temperature 
of the room. This dependency holds between the 
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thermometer in my room and my room’s tempera-
ture. There is no such dependency between my 
room’s temperature and the thermometer in your 
room. The nomic dependency requirement does 
not directly appear in Dretske’s informational 
content definition. However, assigning unity to 
the conditional probability in the definition is a 
direct result of nomic dependencies.
In saying that the conditional probability (given r) 
of s’s being F is 1, I mean to be saying that there 
is a nomic (lawful) regularity between these event 
types, a regularity which nomically precludes r’s 
occurrence when s is not F. (Dretske 1981, p. 245, 
emphasis original)
Besides this rationale, Dretske presents three 
arguments for claiming that the value of conditional 
probability in his definition of informational content 
must be 1, nothing less. Although many scholars 
have questioned the legitimacy of assigning unity 
to conditional probabilities, Dretske says that no 
one has attempted to reject his arguments (Dretske 
1983, p. 84-85).4. What Dretske says is true. There 
is no comprehensive attempt to reject his arguments. 
In this chapter, we will be focusing only on one of 
them, the argument from transitivity, and will only 
briefly mention the other two.
Dretske’s first argument rests on the transitivity 
of information-carrying relations. He claims that 
information flow is possible only if the flow is 
transitive, (i.e., if a signal A carries the information 
B, and if B carries the information C, then A must 
also carry the information C). He calls this prop-
erty of transitivity the Xerox Principle. The name 
is straightforward. The photocopy of a photocopy 
of a document has the same printed information 
as the original. The only way of accommodating 
this principle within his conditional probability 
framework is to assign unity, because it is a simple 
mathematical fact that conditional probabilities are 
not transitive unless they are equal to 1. Hence, in 
order to satisfy the transitivity property, (i.e., the 
Xerox Principle), conditional probabilities must 
be 1.
Secondly, Dretske says that “there is no ar-
bitrary place to put the threshold that will retain 
the intimate tie we all intuitively feel between 
knowledge and information.” If the information of 
‘s’s being F’ can be acquired from a signal which 
makes the conditional probability of this situation 
happening something less than 1–say, for example 
0.95–then “information loses its cognitive punch” 
(Dretske 1981, p. 63).
The principle that he uses for his third argument 
is a close relative of the Xerox Principle, and he 
calls it the Conjunction Principle. If a signal car-
ries the information that B has a probability of p1 
and the information that C has a probability of p2, 
the probability of carrying the information that B 
and C must not be less than the lowest of p1 and 
p2. However, again it is a simple mathematical 
fact that this could not happen with conditional 
probabilities if they are less than 1.
Dretske’s arguments become more intuitive 
once thought of as a result of a learning metaphor. 
For Dretske, information-carrying relations are 
very similar to, if not identical to, ‘learning’ rela-
tions. If I can learn B from A and C from B, then 
I should be able to learn C from A. This intuitive 
claim is nothing but the Xerox Principle, i.e., 
transitivity. ‘Learning B from A’ is identical to ‘A 
carries the information that B.’ Likewise, ‘learning 
C from B’ means ‘B carries the information that 
C.’ These two together imply that ‘I can learn C 
from A,’ i.e., A carries the information that C. A 
similar reasoning applies to the Conjunction Prin-
ciple. For the Arbitrary Threshold Thesis, since 
the metaphor is to learn, we ideally want to learn 
the truth, not an approximation of truth. In short, 
Dretske’s intuitive motivation for his arguments 
is the metaphor of learning.
After this brief exposition, we are now in a 
position to evaluate the fundamental properties 
of Dretske’s informational content. His definition 
is reflexive because the conditional property of 
a signal’s content (s is F), given the same signal 
(s is F), is 1:
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Pr (‘s is F’ | ‘s is F’) = 1
Since the definition is reflexive, we automati-
cally know that it is not anti-reflexive. Dretske’s 
definition is neither symmetric nor anti-symmetric. 
For symmetry to hold, for any signal, such as ‘s 
is F,’ if it carries information that ‘t is G,’ then 
‘t is G’ must also carry the information that ‘s is 
F.’ The antecedent of this conditional implies the 
following equation:
Pr (‘s is F’ | ‘t is G’) = 1
This equation, however, does not guarantee 
that the conditional probability of ‘t is G’ given 
‘s is F’ is 1, which is required for the truth of the 
consequent of the symmetry conditional. In some 
cases, Pr (‘t is G’ | ‘s is F’) will be less than 1; 
in others, it might be exactly 1. Thus, Dretske’s 
definition is neither symmetric nor anti-symmetric.
Lastly, it is obvious that Dretske’s definition 
is transitive. He builds his very framework on 
the basis of transitivity. We can summarize these 
findings with a simple table (see Table 1)
Harms
Harms (1998), in “The Use of Information Theory 
in Epistemology,” undertakes an ambitious task 
which has two main components:
i.  To identify the relevant measure of informa-
tion for tracking efficiency of organisms;
ii.  To flesh out the relationship between the 
information measure and payoff structures.
For the first part of his task, he offers mutual 
information as the right tracking efficiency mea-
sure. For the second part, he shows that mutual 
information is independent of payoff structures. 
Although both of these tasks are philosophically 
important, for our immediate purposes we shall 
focus only on the first one.
For identifying the relevant measure of ef-
ficiency tracking, Harms looks to Shannon’s 
mathematical theory of information because he 
thinks that the gap between Shannon’s theory and 
philosophically relevant aspects of information is 
not as large as Dretske and some others think. As 
previously mentioned, Shannon’s theory focuses 
on measuring the amount of information that a 
signal carries, whereas philosophers are interested 
in the content of the signal, not just the amount. 
As a result, some philosophers think of Shannon’s 
theory as not very relevant to philosophical ques-
tions. Harms disagrees:
It is one thing to calculate the accuracy of sending 
and receiving signals; it is another thing entirely 
to say what those messages are about, or what 
it means to understand them. Consequently, one 
might think that since the notion is not semantic, 
it must be syntactic or structural. The dichotomy 
is false, however. What communication theory 
offers is a concept of information founded on a 
probabilistic measure of uncertainty. However, 
even respecting that information theory does not 
presume to quantify or explain meaning, there re-
mains the possibility that the information theoretic 
notion of information can be applied to semantic 
problems. (Harms 1998, p. 481)
Table 1. 
Reflexive Anti- Reflexive Symmetric
Anti- 
Symmetric Transitive Intransitive
Dretske’s Theory √ X X X √ X
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The notion of mutual information, which 
Harms offers as a good candidate for philosophical 
purposes, is simply a similarity measure between 
two variables. It has properties that are useful 
for defining semantic content of informational 
signals or messages. In Shannon’s formalism, the 
mutual information between two variables, I(s,r), 
is defined as follows. Lower case letters without 
subscripts are random variables and lower case 
letters with subscripts are the values of random 
variables (please see the glossary for the definition 
of random variables).
(Mutual Information) I (s,r) = - ∑ Pr(si) log Pr(si) 
+ ∑ Pr(si | rj) log Pr (si | rj)
Since the probability values range between 
0 and 1, the logarithm of a probability is always 
negative, and as a result, the second term in the 
above equation is negative. But the first term, 
because of the minus sign, is positive. Thus, the 
highest value of the mutual information between 
two variables is the same as the value of the first 
term. The first term is nothing other than the en-
tropy of the first variable (again, please see the 
glossary). Hence, the amount of mutual informa-
tion ranges between zero and the entropy of the 
first variable. This leads to an interesting result 
for information-carrying relations: whether or not 
A carries the information that B is not a “yes” or 
“no” issue anymore. In Dretske’s framework, two 
signals either enter into an information-carrying 
relation or they do not; there is no gradation be-
tween these two options. The situation is different 
in Harms’ theory; information-carrying relations 
lie on a continuum in his framework.
This brief exposition of Harms’ theory provides 
enough ground for evaluating his definition’s 
properties. For reflexivity, we need to calculate 
the amount of mutual information of a signal 
with itself.
(Reflexivity) I (s,s) = - ∑ Pr(si) log Pr(si) + ∑ Pr(si 
| si) log Pr (si | si)
Since Pr (si | si) is 1 and the logarithm of 1 is 
0, the second term is 0. I(s,s) ends up being equal 
to the first term of the equation, which is the 
entropy of the variable s. As stated above, this is 
the highest possible value of mutual information. 
In other words, a signal has the highest amount 
of mutual information with itself. Thus, mutual 
information is reflexive.
For symmetry to hold, the following two equa-
tions need to return the same value.
(Symmetry 1) I (s,r) = - ∑ Pr(si) log Pr(si) + ∑ 
Pr(si | rj) log Pr (si | rj)
(Symmetry 2) I (r,s) = - ∑ Pr(rj) log Pr(rj) + ∑ 
Pr(rj | si) log Pr (rj | si)
Since it only takes basic knowledge of alge-
bra and probability to show that these equations 
are equal to each other, we leave the proof to 
the interested reader and conclude that mutual 
information is a symmetric notion.
Whether or not mutual information is transi-
tive is a bit more complicated than determining 
symmetry and reflexivity. Under special circum-
stances, it turns out to be transitive. But in most 
cases, it is not transitive. This fact is a corollary 
of the Data Processing Inequality theorem of the 
mathematical theory of communication.
Data Processing Inequality Theorem: If 
there is an information flow from A to C through 
B, then the mutual information between A and B 
is greater than or equal to the mutual information 
between A and C. More formally:
If A → B → C then I(A,B) ≥ I(A,C). (Cover 1991, 
p. 32)5
For transitivity to hold for mutual information, 
if A carries information that B, and B carries in-
formation that C, then A has to carry information 
that C. In other words, the mutual information 
between A and B needs to be equal to the mutual 
information between A and C. As the theorem 
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suggests, equality happens only in some cases; in 
other cases, I(A, C) turns out to be smaller than 
I(A, B). Thus, mutual information is transitive 
only in some cases, but not in others.
Now, let’s expand our summary table (see 
Table 2) from the previous section with our new 
findings.
Cohen and Meskin
Cohen and Meskin, in their 2006 article, “An 
Objective Counterfactual Theory of Informa-
tion,” explore an alternative route for defining 
informational content. Their motivation for seek-
ing an alternative is to avoid using the notion of 
conditional probabilities. As we saw in the pre-
vious sections, both Dretske and Harms appeal 
to conditional probabilities in their definitions 
of informational content. In fact, this has been 
the standard approach since Shannon. Appeals 
to conditional probabilities, however, come with 
many problems related to the notion of probability 
and its interpretations.6 Cohen and Meskin sug-
gest a radically different alternative that appeals 
to counterfactuals instead of probabilities.
In their paper, Cohen and Meskin begin with a 
crude version of their counterfactual theory, and 
then revise it by adding a non-vacuousness clause 
to avoid some difficulties concerning necessary 
truths. For both the crude and revised accounts, 
they present one weak and one strong version. The 
weak versions take the counterfactual criterion 
as only a sufficient condition for information-
carrying relations, whereas the strong versions 
take it as both necessary and sufficient. The dif-
ference between their strong and weak versions 
is irrelevant for our purposes. Hence, for the sake 
of simplicity, we shall state only the weak version 
of their claim:
x’s being F carries information about y’s being G 
if the counterfactual conditional ‘if y were not G, 
then x would not have been F’ is non-vacuously 
true. (Cohen & Meskin 2006, p. 335)
The non-vacuousness clause excludes assign-
ing the information-carrying relation to cases 
where y’s being G is necessarily true. If y’s being 
G is necessarily true, then the counterfactual will 
prove to be true no matter what; hence, the coun-
terfactual will be vacuously true. Following the 
generally accepted intuition that necessary truths 
carry no information at all,7 Cohen and Meskin 
aim to exclude necessary truths from the set of 
information-carrying signals by adding the non-
vacuousness clause. Cohen and Meskin argue that 
the counterfactual theory of information may be 
preferable to the standard approaches. Leaving 
aside the issue of whether or not their claim is 
true, we shall proceed to analyze the properties 
of their counterfactual definition.
Since the information-carrying relation is de-
termined by a conditional in Cohen and Meskin’s 
framework, the relation automatically becomes 
reflexive. Any conditional, for which the anteced-
ent and the consequent are the same propositions, 
is always true.
For symmetry, we have to assume that one 
signal, say, x’s being F, carries information about 
another signal, say, y’s being G. This assumption 
leads to the truth of the following counterfactual:
Table 2. 
Reflexive Anti- Reflexive Symmetric
Anti- 
Symmetric Transitive Intransitive
Dretske’s Theory √ X X X √ X
Harms’ Theory √ X √ X X X
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(Counterfactual 1) ‘If y were not G, then x would 
not have been F’ is non-vacuously true.’ 
If this conditional implies its converse, then 
symmetry holds for Cohen and Meskin’s coun-
terfactual definition; otherwise, it does not. The 
converse claim is the following:
(Counterfactual 2) ‘If x were not F, then y would 
not have been G’ is non-vacuously true.’
The standard semantics for evaluating the truth 
condition of counterfactuals is Lewis’ possible 
worlds (Lewis 1973; also see the Glossary). In 
Lewis’ semantics, the first counterfactual is true 
if and only if in the closest world where y is not 
G, x is not F. Let’s call this world w1. For the 
second counterfactual to be true, in the closest 
world where x is not F, y must be not G. Let’s 
call this world w2. The truth condition of the first 
counterfactual does not guarantee the truth condi-
tion of the second counterfactual, because there 
could be a world closer than w2 where x is not F 
and yet y is G. In some cases, by coincidence, 
w2 might turn out to be the closest to the actual 
world, but this is not necessarily the case. Thus, 
the counterfactual definition is neither symmetric 
nor anti-symmetric.
It is a well-established fact that counterfactual 
conditionals are not transitive.8 The simplest way 
of seeing this fact is to evaluate the validity of the 
following inference schema:
• A counterfactually implies B.
• B counterfactually implies C.
Therefore,
• A counterfactually implies C.
This inference is NOT valid because the closest 
possible A-world may not be a C-world, given that 
the closest possible A-world is a B-world and the 
closest possible B-world is a C-world. So even if 
the conclusion follows from the premises in some 
cases, there could be other cases in which it does 
not. Thus, the counterfactual definition of infor-
mation-carrying relations is neither transitive nor 
intransitive. In Cohen and Meskin’s own words,
[The counterfactual] account implies that the 
information-carrying relation is non-transitive, 
it does not imply that the information-carrying 
relation is intransitive. Our account denies that 
information-carrying is transitive tout court, but it 
allows that in many (but not all) cases information 
may flow from one event to another along a chain 
of communication. (Cohen & Meskin 2006, p. 340)
We could complete our summary table (see 
Table 3) by adding the results of the analysis of 
Cohen and Meskin’s counterfactual theory.
As the above table suggests, there is a consen-
sus about reflexivity. This is only to be expected 
because, after all, a signal, if it has some infor-
mational content, will carry information about its 
own content. The disagreement, however, arises 
in the cases of symmetry and transitivity. The next 
section focuses on this disagreement.
Table 3. 
Reflexive Anti- Reflexive Symmetric
Anti- 
Symmetric Transitive Intransitive
Dretske’s Theory √ X X X √ X
Harms’ Theory √ X √ X X X
C & M’s Theory √ X X X X X
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INFORMATION-CARRYING 
RELATIONS: A GENERAL ANALYSIS
Among the three theories analyzed above, only 
Harms’ theory is symmetric. Symmetry, although it 
provides neat mathematical features, may not be a 
desirable feature for some philosophical purposes. 
One of the long-standing projects in philosophy 
of mind is to give a naturalistic account of mental 
representation. The notion of information seems 
to be a promising candidate for the foundation of 
such a naturalistic account,9 because, after all, a 
mental state acquires information from a state of 
affairs in the world, and thus carries information 
about that state of affairs. If this simple intuition is 
right, however, the required information-carrying 
relation needs to be not symmetric. My mental 
state that represents a dog carries information 
about the dog in my yard, but the dog in my yard 
does not carry information about my mental state. 
Of course, the dog in the yard causes my mental 
state, but it would be wrong to claim that it car-
ries information about my mental state. In other 
words, information-carrying relations are different 
than causal relations. For the goal at hand, i.e., to 
account for mental representation, any symmetric 
notion of informational content fails to do the job. 
A similar story could easily be told for linguistic 
representation as well. Thus, ideally, we want a 
non-symmetric conceptualization of information-
carrying relations, especially for explaining mental 
and linguistic representation.
After this short analysis, one may conclude that 
Harms’ claim about the relevance of Shannon’s 
theory for philosophical purposes is wrong (please 
see the quotation in Section 3.2.). However, this 
would be too quick of a judgment, because there 
may be some other notions within the rich reper-
toire of the mathematical theory of information 
that may serve better for Harms’ theory. In fact, 
there is a very good candidate that has all the de-
sired features of mutual information without being 
symmetric: it is the Kullback-Leibler divergence 
measure. Further research is needed for evaluating 
the plausibility of this measure.
For assessing whether or not transitivity is a 
desired feature for information-carrying relations, 
the Data Processing Inequality theorem, as stated 
in Section 3.2., is crucial. For the ease of readers, 
let us state the theorem once again:
Data Processing Inequality Theorem: If A → 
B → C then I(A,B) ≥ I(A,C) 
Transitivity holds only for the equality condi-
tion in the greater than or equal to relation between I 
(A, B) and I (A, C). For other cases, transitivity fails. 
The equality condition occurs only if the chain 
formed by the information from A to C through 
B (A → B → C) is a Markov chain10. A Markov 
chain occurs when the conditional distribution 
of C depends only on B and is independent of A. 
Obviously, this is a very strict constraint, and it 
is rarely true in real life information channels. If 
this constraint is not fulfilled, then the probability 
of having equality becomes lower and lower as 
the chain of information flow becomes longer. 
Hence, transitivity is valid only in idealized cases. 
Once again, it should be noted that transitivity 
corresponds to the equality between I(A,B) and 
I(A,C) in the data processing equality theorem, 
not the greater than relation.
Markov chains, i.e., informational chains 
where only the two subsequent members of the 
chain conditionally depend on each other, are not 
strong enough to exploit the statistical regularities 
that may exist in an informational source. Shannon, 
in his seminal article, “The Mathematical Theory 
of Communication”, showed the importance of 
longer conditional dependencies in a sequence for 
exploiting the statistical regularities in an infor-
mational source (Shannon 1948, p.413-416). The 
informational source that he chose was English. 
As it is known, some letters are more frequent 
than others in English. This is the main reason 
for assigning the highest point value to the letter 
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Q in Scrabble; it is the least frequently used letter 
in the English language. This is an important sta-
tistical regularity of English, but not the only one. 
There are also patterns depending on the previous 
letters that occur in a sequence. For example, the 
probability of having an ‘S’ after an ‘I’ is different 
than the probability of having a ‘C’ after an ‘I.’ 
Similarly, the probability of having a ‘U’ after the 
sequence ‘YO’ is different than the probability of 
having an ‘R.’ Shannon used these statistical pat-
terns in sequence in order to produce intelligible 
sequences in English without feeding any extra 
rule to the sequence-producing mechanism. For 
all sequences, he assumed a 27-symbol alphabet, 
the 26 letters and a blank. In the first sequence, he 
used only the occurrence frequencies of letters; 
he called this “first-order approximation.” The 
idea behind the process by which he produced 
the sequence can be thought of in the following 
way. Imagine a 27-sided die upon which each side 
is biased according to its occurrence frequency. 
Then, by simply rolling the die at each step, one 
decides the symbol that should appear for that 
step. The output of his first sequence where only 
letter frequencies are used is the following:
• First-Order Approximation
OCRO HLI RGWR NMIELWIS 
EU LL NBNESEBYA TH EEI AL-
HENHTTPA OOBTTVA NAH BRL.
For the second sequence, the frequencies that 
he used were the frequency of a letter given the 
letter that comes just before E. That is to say, 
instead of using the simple occurrence frequency 
of the letter E, he used the conditional frequency 
of E given the previous letter. For example, if the 
previous letter were K, then he used the occurrence 
frequency of E given K. This is his second-order 
approximation.
• Second-Order Approximation
ON IE ANTSOUTINYS ARE T INC-
TORE ST BE S DEAMY ACHIN D 
ILONASIVE TUCOOWE AT TEA-
SONARE FUSO TIZIN ANDY TOBE 
SEACE CTISBE.
In the third-order approximation, he used the 
occurrence frequencies of letters given the previ-
ous two letters instead of one.
• Third-Order Approximation
IN NO IST LAT WHEY CRATICT 
FROURE BIRS GROCID PONDE-
NOME OF DEMONSTURES OF 
THE REPTAGIN IS REGOACTIONA 
OF CRE.
There is an improvement from the second-
order approximation to the third-order. This 
improvement may not seem significant at first 
glance. However, when measured quantitatively, 
the third-order approximation almost triples 
the success of the second-order approximation. 
Unfortunately, Shannon did not provide such a 
quantitative success index, because for his pur-
poses the improvement was noticeable enough. A 
simple success index that can be used is the ratio 
of the length of the meaningful sequence to the 
Table 4. Improvement index 
Meaningful Sequences (MS) Length of 
MS
Total Length Success 
Index
% Increase
1st Order - 0 72 0 NA
2nd Order ON, ARE, BE, AT, ANDY 13 118 0.11 NA
3rd Order IN, NO, IN NO, WHEY, OF, OF, THE, OF THE, 
IS OF
30 108 0.28 154%
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length of the entire sequence. The success index 
values calculated accordingly are shown in Table 
4. The index value of the third-order approxima-
tion is equal to 2 ½ times the index value of the 
second-order approximation. That is to say, there 
is a significant improvement from the second to 
the third order, and the level of improvement in-
creases exponentially when one moves to higher 
order approximations such as the fourth-order, 
the fifth-order and so on.
In short, the sequence of English letters be-
comes much more meaningful when one increases 
the length of the dependencies in conditional prob-
abilities. In other words, a successful use of sta-
tistical regularities requires longer informational 
chains in which the conditional probability of an 
entity depends not just on the previously occurring 
one, but on several others that come before that 
entity. Shannon’s second-order approximation, 
conditional probabilities given just the previous 
letter, corresponds to the idea of Markov chains as 
mentioned above. Dretske’s insistence on transitiv-
ity presumes a Markov chain and hence stops at 
the second-order approximation level. However, 
the amount of information that one can exploit 
from an informational source by a Markov chain 
is very limited, as shown in Shannon’s second-
order approximation. Most of the informational 
sources (for example, natural languages and the 
external world) are much richer, and to exploit 
such richness one needs to extend dependencies 
beyond the limits of a Markov chain. As Table 4 
shows, even going one order level up from a strict 
Markov chain significantly increases the ability 
to exploit regularities in an informational source. 
Hence, transitivity is not a desirable feature for 
such purposes.
In this section, we have concluded that a non-
symmetric and non-transitive approach to identify-
ing the content of information-carrying relations 
will serve better for some philosophical purposes. 
This means that an information-carrying relation 
is not an equivalence relation. Although equiva-
lence is needed for a neatly organized domain of 
informational entities, it turns out that reality is 
much messier than we would like it to be. Let’s 
add these findings into our summary table (see 
Table) for a complete visual depiction.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter, we have completed a comprehen-
sive analysis of information-carrying relations in 
terms of fundamental mathematical properties: 
reflexivity, symmetry and transitivity. As Table 
5 above depicts, a reflexive, non-symmetric and 
non-transitive content definition is better suited 
for philosophical purposes. Given this, it looks 
as though Cohen and Meskin’s counterfactual 
theory of semantic information is the best avail-
able candidate for the philosopher’s ideal expec-
tation. This result, however, needs to be taken 
with a grain of salt, because Cohen and Meskin’s 
theory completely avoids Shannon’s formalism. 
Shannon’s mathematical theory of information 
has proven to have a high explanatory power for 
the technical features of information flow. The 
Table 5. 
Reflexive Anti- Reflexive Symmetric
Anti- 
Symmetric Transitive Intransitive
Dretske’s Theory √ X X X √ X
Harms’ Theory √ X √ X X X
C & M’s Theory √ X X X X X
Ideal Expectation √ X X X X X
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main motivation for using information-theoretic 
notions for solving philosophical problems was 
to exploit this explanatory power. Cohen and 
Meskin’s counterfactual theory does not have this 
benefit because it avoids Shannon’s formalism. 
Whether or not this is a price worth paying is an 
important question that requires further research.
Although the chapter provides a thorough 
analysis of the issue at hand, it does, by necessity, 
leave some questions unanswered. Attempting to 
answer these questions will be an essential part 
of the future trends in the literature. For now, let 
us state three of these questions as suggestions 
for future research:
i.  What is the role of non-propositional in-
formation bearers for the philosophically 
relevant analysis of information flow?
ii.  Is there a non-symmetric notion within the 
repertoires of the mathematical theory of 
information that successfully accounts for 
information measure and payoff structures, 
as Harms’ theory does? As suggested above, 
the Kullback-Leibler divergence measure 
seems to be a good candidate for this pur-
pose and it needs to be analyzed from this 
perspective.
iii.  Is it possible to provide a probabilistic ver-
sion of Dretske’s informational content? A 
probabilistic version of Dretske’s definition 
would carry the exact definition without as-
signing unity to conditional probabilities. In 
this way, some of the seemingly implausible 
consequences of assigning unity would be 
avoided.
‘If A had been the case, C would have been the 
case’ is true (at a world w) iff (1) there are no 
possible A-worlds (in which case it is vacuous), 
or (2) some A-world where C holds is closer (to 
w) than is any A-world C does not hold (Lewis 
1973, p. 560).
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KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
Counterfactuals: A counterfactual is a con-
ditional where the antecedent is a non-factual 
statement. For material conditionals, when the 
antecedent is false, then the conditional is auto-
matically true. However, this is not the case for 
counterfactual conditionals as can be seen from 
the following example: If Oswaldo had not shot 
the Kennedy, someone else would have.
Entropy: In Shannon’s theory, entropy is the 
measure of the uncertainty of a message. This 
concept, which is originated from Thermodynam-
ics, is prevalently used in different fields and in 
different senses. Shannon’s entropy is the sense 
that is being used in this chapter.
Kullback – Leibler Divergence Measure: 
This information-theoretic concept is a measure 
of the divergence between the probability distribu-
tions of random variables. If we assume that p and 
q are the probability distributions of two random 
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variables, then the Kullback-Leibler Divergence, 
D(p||q), is calculated with the following formula: 
∑ pi . log (pi/qi)
Markov Chains: A Markov chain is a sto-
chastic process with the Markov property: A 
process has the Markov property if the conditional 
probability distribution of the future states of the 
process depends upon only the present state and a 
specific (say m) number of past states. The number 
m determines the order of the Markov chain. For 
example, Markov chains of order 0 are called 
memoryless systems because the future states 
depend only on the present state. In this chapter, 
we use the term Markov chain as a shortcut for 
Markov chains of order 1.
Possible Worlds Semantics: As stated in the 
counterfactuals entry above, the truth condition for 
counterfactuals is different than the truth condition 
for material conditionals. Possible worlds seman-
tics developed for specifying the truth condition 
for counterfactuals by Lewis and Stalnaker. Lewis 
defines the truth condition as following:
Random Variable: Random variables are used 
in probability theory. They assign numerical values 
to the outcomes of an experiment. Usually, they 
are represented by capital letters such as X, Y.
ENDNOTES
1  In the title of his article, Shannon inten-
tionally used the word ‘communication’ to 
avoid philosophical ambiguities of ‘infor-
mation’. Despite this, the common practice 
in the literature is to call his theory ‘the 
mathematical theory of information’. This 
common practice is adapted in this chapter 
for consistency with the literature.
2 Several people claimed that this connection 
between the entropy of thermodynamics 
and the measure for the expected surprisal 
value (information) points out some deep 
metaphysical connections (Wiener 1961, 
Wheeler 1994, Chalmers 1996, Brooks & 
Wiley 1988].
3  For an analysis of and a suggested solution 
for this paradox, please see Floridi (2004) and 
Floridi’s forthcoming book, The Philosophy 
of Information.
4  Dretske’s BBS open commentary article 
(1983) and the special issue of Synthese on 
Dretske’s theory (1987) together give us a 
valuable collection of these criticisms.
5 The theorem is rephrased for the sake of 
simplicity.
6  For details regarding these problems, please 
see Demir’s dissertation (2006), which is 
available at http://scholarworks.iu.edu.
7  It is important to note that some philosophers 
disagree with this claim. Bar-Hillel (1952), 
Hintikka (1970) and Bremer (2003) are 
useful sources for a balanced presentation 
of this debate.
8  Brogaard and Salerno (2008) claim that 
when the contextual features of an argu-
ment are taken into account, counterfactuals 
satisfy transitivity. It needs to be stated that 
their claim is based on a misunderstanding 
of Lewis’ possible worlds semantics. The 
details of their misunderstanding will need 
to be explained some other time.
9  Dietrich (2007) has a concise review of such 
attempts.
10  For the sake of simplicity, I use ‘Markov 
chains’ for ‘Markov chains of order 1’. Mar-
kov chains can have any number of order. 
For details, please see the Glossary.
